Beanies are fun. Politics is, well, politics. This blog is, therefore, all about exploring the fun side of politics. And hopefully discovering some hidden truths along the way. I currently study Arts/Law at Sydney University, Australia, with a major in Government and International Relations. I have a soft spot for Malaysian politics, because I'm Malaysian; and U.S. affairs, because that's what got me interested in politics in the first place. I particularly enjoy exploring the relationship between pop culture and politics. Incidentally, I own two beanies.
A show after my own heart, with an impressive team, including Ezra Zaid (publisher of Zaid Ibrahim’s Saya Pun Melayu*) and Mark Teh of the Five Arts Centre. (Random observation - it’s an all-male cast. Where are all the female Stephen Colberts of Malaysia?? Clearly I must do something about this and address this gaping hole in the Malaysian media industry when I get back.) One of four shows currently featured on online Malaysia-based TV network PopTeeVee, here’s how That Effing Show describes itself:
That Effing Show is a satirical news show that laughs, pokes fun and points out the (often) obvious and not-so-obvious absurdities of Malaysian socio-political life. In addition to the “liberal/progressive news-commentary thingy”, the show embarks on special projects such as the wildly viraled I Am A Macha music video, and the ASTRO World Cup ad spoofs.
The Daily Show with Jon Stewart is an obvious reference, but the creators also like to think that they suckle at the comedic breasts of P. Ramlee, Monty Python, Saturday Night Live, The Late Show with David Letterman and Jangan Ketawa.
Bonus points to the Show for starting their 81st episode ‘Crimewatch, KL’ with the opening line from Ben Folds’ song, ‘Effington’! It’s a place we all want to live in…
*Upon further googling, I found out that Ezra is Zaid’s son, and that he’d recently been arrested by the Selangor Islamic Department (Jais) for publishing the Malay translation of a book by openly-gay Islamic scholar Irshad Manji. Looks like both father and son aren’t afraid of controversy.
I just finished my exams for this semester! Yay! It also means I’ve completed all the undergrad requirements to get into Honours, so assuming I don’t fail any of my Arts subjects this semester, I’m going to spend next year conducting some Serious Political Research (as opposed to the frivolity of these past three years…).
But talking about Serious Political Research, I just wanted to share my final research paper for the pre-Honours unit I did this semester, Power (yes, that’s the name of the unit. Talk about short and sweet). It examines the Bersih 3.0 rally held in Kuala Lumpur on April 28 this year, and how it managed to garner the extent of local and international support it did. I really wanted to post it here because I don’t think there’s enough rigorous academic analysis of Bersih 3.0 out there yet, so hopefully my essay can help shed some light on what happened that day, and why.
Thanks to my parents for their support while I was writing this; especially Dad for taking out a one-month subscription to Malaysia Kini, just for my assignment.
Enjoy!
Bersih 3.0: Online Resistance and Malaysia’s Digital Hidden Transcript
“When the great lord passes the wise peasant bows deeply and silently farts” – Ethiopian proverb (Scott 1990: preface)
1.Introduction
The Bersih 3.0 rally was held in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia on 28 April 2012. Its primary aims, amongst others, were to call for the Malaysian government to clean the electoral roll, provide free and fair access to the media, and stop corruption (Bersih 2012a). As the third rally in six years organised by Bersih, otherwise known as the Coalition for Clean and Fair Elections, it was significant for being the largest street demonstration in Malaysia in a decade and garnering extensive local and global support, with ten other states in Malaysia and Malaysians in cities around the world organizing simultaneous rallies (Hazri 2012).
This essay will examine the Bersih 3.0 rally and explore the reasons for its widespread local and international support in light of mainstream media censorship. Using James Scott’s theory of peasant resistance as a base, this essay will employ the concept of a ‘digital hidden transcript’ as well as a typology of communication functions of social movements to provide a framework for exploring how the Internet helped create a digital hidden transcript that facilitated local and global support for the Bersih 3.0 rally. After outlining the three foundational concepts, the key puzzle with regards to support for Bersih 3.0 in light of the lack of coverage by mainstream media and government bans will be presented. It will subsequently be demonstrated that the Internet facilitated a digital hidden transcript for Bersih supporters to disseminate information, interact, connect with other movements and global supporters, and express themselves creatively. It will be concluded that the Internet has helped create a new ‘hidden transcript’ that facilitates citizen resistance towards repressive governments.
2. Foundational Concepts: Theory of Peasant Resistance, a Digital Hidden Transcript and Social Movement Communication Functions
James Scott’s theory of peasant resistance revolves around the notion that subordinates create and defend ‘hidden transcripts’, or social spaces in which dissent to the official transcript of power relations can be voiced (James 1990: xi). The social production of hegemonic appearances in the official transcript results from elites exerting their influence to create the appearance of naturalized power, as well as subordinates disguising their resistance in order to protect themselves and minimize the consequences of possible failure (James 1990: 87-96). In applying Scott’s notion of the ‘hidden transcript’ to the recent Bersih 3.0 rally in Malaysia, I will draw upon two other concepts:
1. The ‘digital hidden transcript’: A concept put forward by Mark Liew in his examination of blogging as an instrument of student resistance in Singapore. Adopting Scott’s idea of the ‘hidden transcript’, Liew demonstrated how a digital version in the form of student-written blog satires facilitated online discussions that enabled the student community to address conflicting views on controversial issues without the intervention of teachers or parents (Liew 2010: 311). This ‘digital hidden transcript’ re-enacted the conflict underlying classroom relations, while simultaneously illuminating an illicit realm of digital interactions in which students expressed their own interests and identities (Liew 2010: 308). Liew’s reinvention of Scott’s concept has been echoed by Ashley Esarey and Xiao Qiang, who, in an examination of the Chinese blogosphere and its significance as a ‘hidden transcript’, proposed that the freer political expression afforded in blogs had several important effects, such as allowing citizens to gradually develop strategies for challenging regime positions without being subjected to harsh forms of state repression (Esarey and Xiao 2008: 770-771).
2. A typology of communication functions of social movements: Laura Stein’s typology highlights the functions most salient to social movement communication, and identifies the features within web-based communications that contribute to each (Table 1). This typology will provide a structure for outlining how the Internet facilitated a digital hidden transcript for Bersih supporters to disseminate information, interact, connect with other movements and global supporters, and express themselves creatively.
Table 1. Typology of communication functions of social movements and associated web-based communication attributes (Stein 2011: 150-152)
Case study: Bersih 3.0
3. The Puzzle: Support for Bersih 3.0 versus Media Portrayal, Government Bans and Censorship
A key puzzle is how Bersih 3.0 managed to obtain the widespread support it did, given that there was significantly less print media coverage of the event compared to previous Bersih rallies, and that the coalition had been temporarily banned last year by Home Minister Hishamuddin Hussein as a security threat (Centre for Independent Journalism 2012). Additionally, prior to its recent demonstration, media stories had portrayed Bersih negatively, linking it to Christian, Jewish and communist conspiracies, and even Islamic extremists (McDonald 2012).
Since independence, a vital source of power for ruling coalition Barisan Nasional has been the restriction of media freedoms through licensing regulations and the ownership and control of Malaysia’s print and broadcast media (Pepinsky 2012: 9). Nevertheless, in the past fifteen years, technological change, especially via the Internet, has enabled both professional journalists and ordinary citizens to report and access fresh perspectives on Malaysian politics with unprecedented freedom, aided serendipitously by the regime’s effort to establish wide Internet usage among Malaysians (Pepinsky 2012: 9). Using Stein’s typology of communication functions for social movements and their associated web-based communication attributes, the following sections in this essay will explore how the Internet helped create a digital hidden transcript that facilitated local and global support for the Bersih 3.0 rally.
4a. The Internet as a Tool for Disseminating Information and Mobilizing Protesters
The Internet enabled Bersih to disseminate information regarding previous rallies and its overall campaign, and mobilize protesters for the upcoming Bersih 3.0 rally. The Internet, being relatively free of centralized gatekeepers, allows for the direct and uncompromised information dissemination by social movement organizations (SMOs) (Stein 2011: 151).
Some Bersih 3.0 participants were inspired by online articles and video footage of the previous Bersih rallies to take part in the campaign this time around. The rapid speed at and the extent to which photos and videos from Bersih 2.0 spread across the Internet caught the attention of a Malaysian, Kuok Yeow, who participated in the protest this year (Yeow 2012). Yeow, who reported her experience for online alternative news portal The Malaysian Insider, mentioned two particular Youtube videos that had mobilized her to join Bersih 3.0. One of the videos Yeow mentions, ‘Truth that cannot be covered – Bersih 2.0 09/07/2011’by Youtube user ahfusim, juxtaposes statements from various Malaysian government officials regarding the handling of last year’s Bersih 2.0 campaign with graphic footage from the day of the protest itself, and has so far garnered over a million views (Ahfusim 2012).
The Internet also played an important role in enabling Bersih to create its own website and establish itself on various social media and networking platforms such as Facebook, Twitter and Youtube (Photo 1). Bersih used these various sites to promote the upcoming Bersih 3.0 rally, explain Bersih’s agenda and, in the case of Bersih’s Youtube channel, highlight footage from previous rallies as well as appeals for support from Bersih leaders (Bersih428 2012).The promotion of the Bersih 3.0 rally via various social media and networking sites further underlined the Internet’s importance in aiding Bersih’s coordination of real-world events.
Campaign materials were also circulated online, such as a ‘Street Rally Guide for Beginners’ purportedly published by human rights organization Suaram (Photo 2), which potentially provided further encouragement for first-time protesters to attend the rally.
Photo 1. Bersih’s official website, displaying its various links to social media and networking sites – Facebook (left), Youtube (centre), and Twitter (right) (Bersih 2012b)
Photo 2. Excerpt from ‘Street Rally Guide for Beginners’ (original source unknown) (Calderon 2012a)
4b. The Internet as a Tool for Stimulating Interaction and Dialogue
The Internet provided a useful way for citizens to discuss the rally and shape the discourse surrounding it by contrasting online eyewitness accounts with mainstream media reports. Alternative media can serve as relatively independent sites of interaction and dialogue, with online participatory forums providing opportunities for dialogue and discussion, as well as facilitating the creation of discursive networks that offer alternative perspectives (Stein 2011: 152). James Scott extended upon this view by highlighting how social spaces of relative autonomy discipline and produce patterns of resistance via mutual communication within the public of the ‘hidden transcript’ (Scott 1990: 119).
One interesting example with regards to the Bersih 3.0 rally was Marina Mahathir, daughter of former Prime Minister Dr Mahathir Mohamad. Mahathir, who runs her own blog and posted her account of her own experience at the rally, voiced her anger and disappointment at the use of razor wire and tear gas by police against protesters (Mahathir 2012a). Her article was further disseminated via social media and networks, in particular Twitter, Google Plus and Facebook (Mahathir 2012a). As an example of shaping discourse and stimulating dialogue around Bersih, Mahathir engaged in a discussion with her readers in the comments section of her blog entry, in which she underlined doubts regarding the procedures followed by the police (Photo 3), and subtly criticized the ruling party UMNO for its corruption (Photo 4). Additionally, Mahathir wrote another blog entry, entitled ‘Testimonies to Truth’, that provided web links to eyewitness accounts of Bersih 3.0, for blog readers to contrast with accounts from the mainstream media (Mahathir 2012b).
Mahathir’s online postings and discussions are arguably significant on various levels. Firstly, her debate with blog readers was unusually candid in terms of discussing her experience at the rally and criticising UMNO, given her affiliations with the ruling party. Such dialogue would likely have been banned or censored in traditional Malaysian media, though her support for the movement has undoubtedly provided Bersih with a certain measure of legitimacy and publicity.Secondly, Mahathir helped shape the discourse and stimulate dialogue around Bersih 3.0 by engaging in frank discussions with her blog readers and referring them towards other online eyewitness accounts.
Photo 3. Mahathir’s response to a reader’s questions about police procedure at Bersih 3.0 (Mahathir 2012a).
Photo 4. Mahathir shedding light on UMNO corruption (Mahathir 2012a).
4c. The Internet as a Tool for Promoting Lateral Linkages
The Internet was also used to form lateral linkages with other movements and the overseas Malaysian community. By uniting communities of interest across national and transnational space, the Internet can be used to communicate laterally and build networks among social movement supporters (Stein 2011: 152). In particular, the ability to connect one organization’s site to another through hyperlinks is a strategic choice that recognises the presence of other actors and establishes an interconnected sphere of online sites (Stein 2011: 152). It can also help refer supporters to sites of news and research, or national or international social movements affiliated with the cause (Stein 2011: 152).
One example of online cross-organization unity is the association of the Stop Lynas movement with Bersih 3.0. At Bersih 3.0 protests in Kuala Lumpur and elsewhere, supporters of the ‘Save Malaysia Stop Lynas’ (SMSL) campaign were present, wearing green shirts or masks (Photo 5). The SMSL group is part of an environmentalist coalition aimed at stopping Australian miner Lynas Corporation from operating a rare earth plant in Kuantan, Malaysia, due to concern regarding the plant’s health and safety aspects (Kong 2012). SMSL showed strong support for Bersih 3.0 through its official website, with SMSL stating, in a lengthy blog post dedicated to Bersih 3.0,
‘Bersih 3.0 should NOT be compromised. It is precisely because of our lack of transparency and the dirty politics which has brought about the Lynas toxic project.’ (SMSL 2012).
Additionally, SMSL provided hyperlinks to the various facebook pages of Bersih 3.0 campaigns taking place around the country and the world (SMSL 2012). Global Bersih, as the international movement of ‘solidarity rallies’ to support Bersih calls itself (Global Bersih 2012a), demonstrated the ability of the Internet, especially social media and networking platforms, to connect transnational Malaysian communities and further increased international publicity for Bersih 3.0 (Global Bersih 2012b).
Photo 5. A Bersih 3.0 protester wearing a mask supporting both Bersih 3.0 and the Stop Lynas movement (Hamid 2012)
4d. The Internet as a Tool for “Creative Expression”
In discussing the everyday resistance strategies of peasants, James Scott highlighted how a partly sanitized, ambiguous and coded version of the hidden transcript was invariably present in the public discourse of subordinate groups (Scott 1990: 19).Scott identified, amongst others, rumours, gossip, jokes, songs and euphemisms as examples of the folk culture of subordinate groups that fell under this form of political discourse (Scott 1990: 19). The Internet arguably provides new mediums for modern ‘folk culture’ to be transmitted and to reach a greater extent of the population than previously envisaged by Scott, such as satirical videos and political cartoons.
With regards to Bersih, footage of Prime Minister Najib Razak mocking the previous Bersih 2.0 protest was incorporated into ‘Najib Techno Remix’, a Youtube video which intersperses Najib chanting ‘Long live UMNO’ with a clip from the film 300, where King Leonidas yells ‘This is Sparta!’ (MyNameIsRayChong 2011). The video’s apparent implicit message, of Najib as dictatorial leader of the preeminent Malay political party, potentially taps into fears of ethnic minorities that UMNO remains unable to divorce itself from its narrow pro-Malay agenda to develop a more inclusive, merit-based economic and political system (O’Shanassy 2011).
Additionally, an Australian news report that the Prime Minister’s wife Rosmah Mansor allegedly spent AU$100,000 at a Sydney boutique in January 2012 was rapidly circulated online through alternative news portals (Malaysiakini 2012). While Najib denied the spending allegations (The Star 2012), it fuelled speculation regarding government corruption and helped increase support for Bersih 3.0. This is exemplified by the political cartoon below, posted on Global Bersih 3.0’s facebook page, which juxtaposes Najib’s reaction to Bersih 3.0 protestors during his recent visit to London with his wife buying luxury goods from Harrods (Photo 6).
Photo 6. Political cartoon parodying Najib’s reaction to Bersih 3.0 in London (Global Bersih 3.0 2012)
5. Conclusion
To conclude, the Internet facilitated a ‘digital hidden transcript’ for Bersih 3.0 organizers and supporters to counter the lack of coverage and negative portrayal of Bersih by mainstream Malaysian media in light of government censorship.
Firstly, it enabled the direct and uncompromised dissemination of information in the form of online articles and video footage of previous Bersih rallies, as well as campaign materials. Bersih was also able to exploit social media and networking platforms to appeal for support and coordinate the rally.
Secondly, blogs acted as social spaces of relative autonomy that provided opportunities for dialogue and debate, as exemplified by Marina Mahathir’s discussion with blog readers, which provided a degree of candidness and insight lacking in mainstream Malaysian media. By referring her readers to other online eyewitness accounts to contrast with reports from mainstream media, Mahathir also helped shape a web-based discourse of ‘truth’ around Bersih 3.0.
Thirdly, the Internet was used to promote lateral linkages with other movements with similar grievances, in particular the Stop Lynas environmentalist movement, as well as a global network of Malaysians who staged solidarity rallies abroad.
Lastly, the Internet’s potential to embrace new mediums enabled Malaysians to caricature the ruling regime and tap into controversial issues regarding ethnic politics and government corruption through satirical videos, rumours and political cartoons.
While, as Thomas Pepinsky suggests, meaningful political liberalization in Malaysia will not take place absent fundamental changes to Malaysia’s ethnic and class cleavages (Pepinsky 2012: 2-3), it is hoped that this case study demonstrates the potential of technology to assist citizens in present and future efforts to counter the official transcript of power relations.
O’Shanassy, M 2011, ‘Malaysia in 2011: The More Things Stay the Same, the More Thigns Change?’, Asian Survey, vol. 52, no. 1, pp. 165-175.
Pepinsky, TB 2012, ‘Tak Nak Mereform: New Media and Malaysian Politics in Historical Perspective’ (draft version: 10 March 2012), Thomas B. Pepinsky: Papers, accessed 26 May 2012, from https://courses.cit.cornell.edu/tp253/docs/tak_nak.pdf
Scott, J 1990, Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts, Yale University Press, New Haven.
Stein, L 2011, ‘Social Movement Web Use in Theory and Practice: A Content Analysis’, in M Christensen, A Jansson and C Christensen (eds.), Online Territories: Globalization, Mediated Practice and Social Space, Peter Lang, New York, pp. 147-170.
This is the essay I submitted last year to a national essay-writing competition organised by the Perdana Leadership Foundation and MPH Bookstores. It won first prize - which is slightly confusing as there is a grand prize winner (Eric Lee of HELP University College), which technically means I came in second. But I suppose a prize by any other name tastes as sweet (sorry, I make terrible Shakespeare references). I do however really mean what I wrote in the essay (though to be honest I censored myself and tried toning down my criticism of the government), and if I ever become Minister of Education (ha!), I’d totally try implementing my own proposals…More after the jump.
Response to PLF-MPH Essay Competition, ‘Malaysia in a Globalised World’:
3. Vision 2020’s deadline is less than a decade away. Compare Malaysia’s current position with the aspirations of Vision 2020 and outline the most important gaps that need to be addressed for the nation to achieve the goals of Vision 2020.
Educational policies for a Bangsa Malaysia
Conceptualised by former Prime Minister Tun Dr Mahathir bin Mohamad, the ‘Bangsa Malaysia’ concept has ignited much discussion over the years. Although overshadowed by the other strategic challenges, the Bangsa Malaysia concept is vitally important for nation-building in order to achieve the ultimate goal of becoming a developed country. Indeed, Dr Mahathir has pronounced that a united Malaysian nation is ‘not likely to be the most fundamental, but the most basic’ strategic challenge (Mahathir 2001: 34).
In many respects, the Malaysian education system reflects the policy shifts between assimilationism and multiculturalism and the dilemmas associated with forging a national unity. Following a discussion of official measures promoting the Bangsa Malaysia concept in schools and my personal experience as a Malaysian student, I will outline the key challenges in the education system that have hampered the goals of Vision 2020 and policy prescriptions to these challenges which can contribute towards Bangsa Malaysia.
The Razak Report (1956) recognized education as playing an important role in fostering ethnic integration (Lee 2006:230). Officially, current measures in the education system implicitly promote the notion of Bangsa Malaysia. Without doubt, Bahasa Malaysia (BM) as the national language has helped to facilitate interracial communication (Joseph 2008: 191). In schools, Prime Minister Datuk Seri Najib Razak’s 1Malaysia campaign with its focus on multiracialism reminds us of the importance of national unity (Othman 2008). Primary school students recite the Rukunegara faithfully at school assembly every week, while secondary school students learn the importance of values such as tolerance and patriotism in Civic and Citizenship Education lessons. In theory, the extensive socialization received in school should produce model citizens who possess a robust Malaysian identity. However, in reality, this is far from the truth. My spoken Malay, despite obtaining an A in SPM for BM, remains rudimentary, while I can count the fingers on one hand the number of friends I have from other races. When my university lecturer asked Malaysian students in class one day if we knew the Rukunegara principles, none of us could give her a satisfactory reply. It seemed that what we lacked was a deep understanding and appreciation of what it means to be Malaysian.
Educated in a Chinese vernacular primary and secondary school, I mainly interacted with those from my own ethnic community. Daily classes required the dexterity of switching between multiple languages - reading textbooks set in BM, discussing them with classmates in Chinese, and reinterpreting everything in my head into English, the language I am most comfortable with. Moral Education was, despite its best intentions, a tedious subject to be memorized, with the various ‘nilai’ to be applied to hypothetical situations. Furthermore, my classmates and I were painfully aware of the differences between our school and the mainstream national schools. I was envious of those going to national schools and MARA junior science colleges, because they seemed to have wider opportunities and better educational facilities. In Form 5, my friends and I puzzled over pre-university matriculation programs –so much harder to get into because we are not bumiputera, yet it seemed like a better alternative compared to the STPM, which is supposedly tougher but does not guarantee a local university entry. In short, Bangsa Malaysia seemed more like a rhetorical concept rather than a lived reality, let alone a goal that could be achieved by the year 2020.
I believe that the fundamental problem with the Malaysian education system is its failure to cultivate a genuine sense of Bangsa Malaysia due to the inherent tension between the need to accommodate the interests of both the Malay and non-Malay communities (Segawa 2009: 14). Noriyuki Segawa attributes this tension to the conflicting need to balance, among other factors, affirmative action policies, the communal demands of Barisan Nasional’s ethnic-based parties, and economic growth strategies (Segawa 2009: 201). This insightful observation of Malaysia’s contradictory public policies could be extended to the National Economic Advisory Council’s description of the criteria needed for a successful New Economic Model: “a key challenge […] is the design of effective measures that strike a balance between the special position of bumiputra and legitimate interests of different groups” (NEAC 2010:10). While the need to accommodate the various interest groups is critical for promoting national unity, it has resulted in racially and socially polarizing education policies (Joseph 2008:186; Lee 2009: 246).
In order to resolve the tension between assimilationism and multiculturalism in the Malaysian education system, a number of issues need to be addressed. Firstly, both elementary and secondary vernacular or national-type schools could be phased out in favour of national schools. Although one might argue that Vision Schools already provide a solution towards fostering racial harmony, they are inadequate for several reasons. Physical interaction among students from three separate vernacular schools during non-class periods is hardly sufficient to promote racial unity. Furthermore, there appears to be poor planning and a lack of initiative and understanding of the purpose of Vision Schools on the part of those involved (Malakolunthu 2009: 134). Conversely, the integration of students from all races into national schools from the elementary level would help promote the development of friendships among students from an early age. A study on hostel preferences at a Malaysian university in terms of race and religion points to the significance of primary school origins and highlights the potential benefits of early ethnic integration (Chan 2004: 29). It also cautions that both primary and secondary national schools would need to ensure a high ethnic mix for such a policy to be effective (Chan 2004: 29). It is worth noting that Yayasan 1Malaysia is currently conducting an Internet poll entitled, ‘Do you think that Malaysia should adopt a single school system?’ (Yayasan 1Malaysia 2010a). Despite the small number of respondents so far, it is interesting to note that there have been no votes for maintaining vernacular schools, with respondents either voting outright for a single school system or a cautious ‘maybe’ (Yayasan 1Malaysia 2010a). While it is premature to say whether the survey demonstrates a general desire among Malaysians to eliminate vernacular schools, it is an encouraging sign.
Secondly, the potential of language as a tool in helping to foster a spirit of Bangsa Malaysia within the education system should be explored. In particular, there is a need to address the concerns of non-Malay communities over the teaching of their mother tongues in national schools. In terms of formal language studies, it is already compulsory for all students to learn BM and English in elementary and secondary school. Although the recent government announcement, that the Pupil’s Own Language (POL) policy is to be fully implemented at all national primary schools to give non-Malay pupils the choice of learning their own mother tongues (New Straits Times 2010), is commendable, I would support both primary and secondary national schools making it compulsory for all students to learn a third language. Based on my own experience as a vernacular school student who learnt three languages, there is no reason why students in national schools could not do the same. Furthermore, such a policy would allow students to sample the mother tongues of their classmates, such as Malay students learning to speak Chinese, and Chinese students speaking Tamil or vice versa. Learning a foreign language would also open a gateway to learning about another’s culture, literature and history (ACSSO 2007) and thus an appreciation of the rich diverse backgrounds of Malaysians.
Thirdly, I believe the promotion of creative arts education can help foster a deeper level of understanding between the various ethnic communities. Academic Sumit K. Mandal has discussed the notion of “transethnic solidarities”, whereby Malaysians actively participate in society without respect to ethnic background and reject primordial notions of ethnicity (Mandal 2004:50). He identified theatre educationist Janet Pillai as one such member within the local arts community who embraces the concept (Mandal 2004: 50). Last year, I had the privilege of working with Madam Pillai as a researcher at the arts and heritage education NGO she founded, Arts-Ed. Part of my job involved interviewing local traders in the Georgetown heritage zone. I found myself completely unprepared for the task, especially when it came to communicating with shopkeepers in Little India. In my best attempt at colloquial Malay, I stammered, “Encik…boleh tak saya interview kamu?”. My lack of people skills was clearly revealed after I was thrown out of various shops before eventually convincing the traders, after multiple visits, that I was a bona-fide researcher. Nevertheless, the experience was extremely valuable. I learnt to be patient and humble, while absorbing the fascinating histories of the places I visited. Walking around Georgetown, snapping photos of a man sewing songkoks and interviewing the local nyonya kuih seller, I began to truly appreciate the melting-pot of cultures that Georgetown symbolizes. Working with the traders also helped me understand the urban and social problems they faced, such as earning enough income to support family members and cope with medical problems, or worrying over their dying trades and the fact that my generation showed little interest in learning such traditional skills. I was also impressed by the knowledge, passion and enthusiasm of my Arts-Ed colleagues for Georgetown’s history, not to mention the ease with which they interacted with local traders and residents within the multiracial neighbourhood. It was a more insightful educational journey than any Moral Education or History class had given me. As a result of that experience, I have become firmly convinced that arts education and the arts community should be a crucial part of the educational curriculum. I believe that incorporating actual community work, through interactive and stimulating approaches, into relevant school subjects would allow students to better engage in and appreciate Malaysia’s vibrant history and its multi-ethnic social complexion.
Finally, to gauge the effectiveness of such policies at forging national integration and empower students to contribute towards policymaking, a national student forum on existing national integration policies and potential measures to achieve Bangsa Malaysia could be organized by either the government or the Perdana Leadership Foundation annually. Students who excel in either academic or non-academic aspects could be nominated by their schools to participate in the dialogue. Such an initiative has been implemented in countries such as Australia, with its Australian Youth Forum (AYF), which provides a communication platform between the Australian government and youths (AYF 2010). Earlier this year, I participated in a dialogue organized by the AYF, and came away inspired by the commitment that the government showed towards taking the views and opinions of Australian youths into consideration, with various Parliamentary Secretaries discussing their opinions with us, as well as the comprehensive understanding and interest demonstrated by teenage participants towards public policy. Inferentially, a similar Malaysian-based initiative with regards to the building of a Bangsa Malaysia would have both short- and long-term benefits by enabling the government to obtain student feedback on its policies, while creating a constructive space for students from diverse fields to exchange ideas and opinions on national integration.
To conclude, the foundation of Vision 2020 lies in achieving its first strategic challenge - a Bangsa Malaysia willing to work together to achieve its goals. However, current educational policies that reflect the inherent policy tension between assimilationism and multiculturalism hamper the achievement of this basic aim. Four suggested solutions were discussed. Firstly, vernacular or national-type schools could be phased out in favour of national schools to promote early interracial interaction. Secondly, national schools could make learning a foreign language in addition to English and BM compulsory to stimulate cross-cultural understanding.Thirdly, an interactive form of arts education that incorporates community work could help engender a valuable dimension to classroom learning, particularly in the subjects of History and Civic Education. Finally, a national student forum could be organized to evaluate the effectiveness of national integration measures and empower students to contribute constructively towards the policymaking process. These measures are instrumental in building a strong foundation for a Bangsa Malaysia and achieving the strategic challenges of Vision 2020.
Chan, H.C. 2004, ‘Racial Polarisation and Room-mate Choices Among University Students’, in Cheah, B.K., ed., The Challenge of Ethnicity: Building a Nation in Malaysia, Singapore: Marshall Cavendish International, 9-40.
Joseph, C. (2007) ‘Ethnicities and Education in Malaysia: Differences, Inclusions and Exclusions’, in G Wan (eds.), The Education of Diverse Student Populations: A Global Perspective, USA: Springer Science+ Business Media B.V., 183-208.
Lee, H.G. (2006) ‘Globalisation and Ethnic Integration in Malaysian Education’ in Saw, S.H. and Kesavapany, K., eds., Malaysia: Recent Trends and Challenges, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 230-259.
Mahathir, M. (2001) ‘Vision 2020: The Way Forward’, Military Technology, October 2001, 33-39.
Malakolunthu, S. (2009) ‘Educational Reform and Policy Dynamics: A Case of the Malaysian “Vision School” for Racial Integration’, Educational Research for Policy and Practice, 8(2), 123-135.
Mandal, S.K. (2004) ‘Transethnic Solidarities, Racialisation and Social Equality’, in Gomez, E.T., ed., The State of Malaysia: Ethnicity, Equity and Reform, London: RoutledgeCurzon, 49-78.
NEAC (2010) New Economic Model for Malaysia: Part I: Strategic Policy Directions, Putrajaya: National Economic Advisory Council.
Segawa, N. (2009) Juggling between Assimilationism and Multiculturalism: Language and Education Policies for National Integration in Malaysia, Sydney: University of Sydney.
